Details
Decision-making in High-Risk Projects
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CHF 130.00 |
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| Verlag: | Springer |
| Format: | |
| Veröffentl.: | 02.07.2024 |
| ISBN/EAN: | 9789819730568 |
| Sprache: | englisch |
Dieses eBook enthält ein Wasserzeichen.
Beschreibungen
<p>This book identifies and systematically confirms the various factors that allow dangerous nuclear power projects to proceed without adequate risk assessment, even as society recognizes the magnitude of risks associated with nuclear power generation. For the first time, it employs a communication game model to explore each factor individually.</p>
<p>The novel feature of the book lies in its theoretical analysis of institutional factors, such as the possibility of regulatory capture by electric power companies, the likelihood of these companies concealing early warning signs, the societal demand for excessive safety leading to intolerance of even minor incidents, and the ambiguity of liability. These issues have been pointed out and discussed by many commentators, including the media, but they have never been rigorously verified through economic model analysis. Furthermore, the book discusses why trial and error, a common approach in technological development, is particularly challenging for nuclear power.</p>
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<p>The novel feature of the book lies in its theoretical analysis of institutional factors, such as the possibility of regulatory capture by electric power companies, the likelihood of these companies concealing early warning signs, the societal demand for excessive safety leading to intolerance of even minor incidents, and the ambiguity of liability. These issues have been pointed out and discussed by many commentators, including the media, but they have never been rigorously verified through economic model analysis. Furthermore, the book discusses why trial and error, a common approach in technological development, is particularly challenging for nuclear power.</p>
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<p>Introduction.- Decision making problems in risky projects.- Literature Review.- Model Construction.- Incentive to Acquire a Precursor.- Incentive to Continue the Research Trial.- Confidentiality of Observed Precursor.- Conclusion.</p>
<p>Introduction.- Decision making problems in risky projects.- Literature Review.- Model Construction.- Incentive to Acquire a Precursor.- Incentive to Continue the Research Trial.- Confidentiality of Observed Precursor.- Conclusion.</p>
<p>Akio Torii is a researcher at the Institute of Economic Research, Chuo University, Hachiouji, Japan, and Professor Emeritus at both Chuo University and Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan. His extensive work includes authoring and co-editing in the fields of Industrial Organization, both Theory and Empirical, with a focus on productivity/efficiency analysis in manufacturing, energy sector analysis, utility regulation, retail/wholesale distribution sectors, logistic industries, non-life insurance industries, and dynamic macro-distribution theories. Notable recognitions include the Best Paper Award from the European Media Management Association (2016) and the Japan Society of Marketing and Distribution (2007). He has also contributed to numerous research committees for public organizations like the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, and Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry beside many other institutions.</p>
<p>This book identifies and systematically confirms the various factors that allow dangerous nuclear power projects to proceed without adequate risk assessment, even as society recognizes the magnitude of risks associated with nuclear power generation. For the first time, it employs a communication game model to explore each factor individually.</p>
<p>The novel feature of the book lies in its theoretical analysis of institutional factors, such as the possibility of regulatory capture by electric power companies, the likelihood of these companies concealing early warning signs, the societal demand for excessive safety leading to intolerance of even minor incidents, and the ambiguity of liability. These issues have been pointed out and discussed by many commentators, including the media, but they have never been rigorously verified through economic model analysis. Furthermore, the book discusses why trial and error, a common approach in technological development, is particularly challenging for nuclear power.</p>
<p>The novel feature of the book lies in its theoretical analysis of institutional factors, such as the possibility of regulatory capture by electric power companies, the likelihood of these companies concealing early warning signs, the societal demand for excessive safety leading to intolerance of even minor incidents, and the ambiguity of liability. These issues have been pointed out and discussed by many commentators, including the media, but they have never been rigorously verified through economic model analysis. Furthermore, the book discusses why trial and error, a common approach in technological development, is particularly challenging for nuclear power.</p>
Guides decisions in a divided society Decodes high-risk, high-reward dilemmas Addresses regulatory and corporate challenges
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