reading

“You, Canaris, have to promote an uprising with the aid of the Ukrainian organizations which are working with you and which have the same objectives, namely, the Poles and the Jews.”

And then a third discussion, or rather, a very brief remark at the end of a very short conversation between the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Canaris was made in connection with this subject, after the intention had been made quite clear. It was about how the uprising was to be carried out and what was to happen. I remember this so well, because he demanded that the farm houses must burn. Canaris discussed the matter with me in detail later on and referred to this remark.

That is what happened, as I have described it. This was the sequence: Directives from the High Command to Keitel; then passed on by Keitel to Canaris at this meeting; then repeated to Canaris in the form of a remark which I remember so well because it contained the words about farm houses in flames, which is rather an unusual thing to say.

THE PRESIDENT: It would assist the Tribunal if one question at a time were asked and if the witnesses would answer “yes” or “no” to the question asked, and explain, if they must, afterwards. But questions and answers should be put as shortly as possible and only one question should be asked at a time.

DR. SAUTER: [Continuing.] Yesterday you said that these remarks of Ribbentrop are not in the diary, if I understood you correctly.

LAHOUSEN: No, this is not from the diary but has a connection with Canaris’ diary, by means of which I can make this remark.

DR. SAUTER: You said yesterday that this remark struck you as being rather surprising.

DR. SAUTER: And today you said that General Blaskowitz also made some striking statements. You also mentioned, however, that these statements of Blaskowitz were not entered in the diary.

DR. SAUTER: Now, it occurs to me—and I would like you to answer this question: Why, if this remark of the Defendant Ribbentrop surprised you, was it not entered in the diary?

LAHOUSEN: Regarding Blaskowitz, I have to say—or rather—repeat the following:

I said that I did not hear the Blaskowitz matter mentioned in this connection during the meeting, and I cannot assume that this subject came up concurrently, otherwise it would have been entered in these notes. It may be, of course, that the Blaskowitz matter was discussed at a time when I was not there. I have only put down what I heard or what Canaris told me to enter in the record.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, but the substance was not altered. Whether one speaks of extermination, elimination, or the burning of farms, they all amount to terroristic measures.

DR. SAUTER: Did Von Ribbentrop really talk of killing Jews? Are you sure you remember that?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I definitely remember that, because Canaris talked not only to me, but also to others in Vienna about this matter and called me time and again as a witness.

LAHOUSEN: That did not settle the matter, but these words of Ribbentrop’s were frequently discussed.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, something else. You have told us about murderous designs on which you or your department or other officers were employed or which you were charged to carry out. Did you report these to any police station as the law required? May I point out that according to German law failure to report intended crimes is punishable with imprisonment or in serious cases with death.

LAHOUSEN: Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot follow you. I am not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man.

DR. SAUTER: As far as I know, that is also punishable according to Austrian law.

DR. SAUTER: In other words, you never reported the intended crime, either as a private person or as an official?

LAHOUSEN: I should have had to make a great many reports—about 100,000 projected murders, of which I knew and could not help but know. You can read about them in the records—and about shootings and the like—of which of necessity I had knowledge, whether I wanted to know or not, because, unfortunately, I was in the midst of it.

DR. SAUTER: It is not a matter of shootings which had taken place and could no longer be prevented, but rather a matter of intended murder at a time when perhaps it could have been prevented.

LAHOUSEN: I can only answer: Why did the person who received this order at first hand not do the same thing? Why did he not denounce Hitler for instance?

DR. SAUTER: You, as a general of the German Wehrmacht, should have asked Hitler . . .

LAHOUSEN: I am sorry, you overestimate my rank, I had only been a general in the German Wehrmacht since the first of January 1945, that is, only for 4 months. At that time I was lieutenant colonel and later colonel of the General Staff, not in the General Staff.

DR. SAUTER: But in 1938, immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you at once made a request to be taken into the German Wehrmacht by Hitler.

LAHOUSEN: I did not make a request, and I did not have to do this. Wherever I was in the service, I was known for my special services. I was not a stranger. With the knowledge of the Austrian Government and also, in a restricted sense, with the knowledge of the German authorities (that is, of certain persons) I was working for the Austrian Government in a matter which exclusively concerned things outside the scope of Austrian internal policy. I co-operated with the Wehrmacht, as well as with the Italian and Hungarian Governments with the knowledge of the Austrian Government and the competent authorities. There were matters of politics which were not my domain.

DR. SAUTER: But I believe, Witness, your memory deceives you, because immediately after Hitler’s attack on Austria, you called on the General Staff in Berlin and there you tried to get a commission in the German Wehrmacht, and you now deny this. You also filled in and signed a questionnaire, in which you declared your complete allegiance to the Greater German Reich and to Adolf Hitler; and shortly afterwards you took the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler.

LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, I did it just as everybody else who was in the position of being transferred from one office and capacity to another.

DR. SAUTER: Before, you said you did not apply for this appointment, and I have information to the contrary: That you, in the company of two or three other officers were the first to go to Berlin with the sole purpose of asking the Chief of the German General Staff Beck to take you into the German Army.

LAHOUSEN: I am very glad that you mention this subject, because it allows me to make my position perfectly clear. It was not necessary for me to make an application for my future position in the German Wehrmacht. I was known because of my military activities, just as any military attaché is known in the country where he is accredited.

Moreover, I can easily explain why my rise in office was so rapid. I have said that my activities and my co-operation with the Austrian Military Intelligence Service, which were not determined by me but by my superior Austrian office, were at that time directed against the neighboring country of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was the country that was next on the list after Austria. Therefore, it was natural that my later chief, Canaris, who knew me from my former position, was very interested in having me promoted in his department. He put in a word for me, and so did Colonel General Beck, whom I was visiting. Other people also know this; and I have now told everything that General Beck told me at that time.

DR. SAUTER: Then it is true, you did go to Berlin and apply to be transferred into the German Wehrmacht, which you at first denied?

LAHOUSEN: No, that is not true, I did not apply. Others made the request. I can even say that I did not go there: I flew there. Canaris, who knew me not only in my military capacity but also in regard to my personal attitude (just as Marogna had known me and just as Colonel General Beck, who was informed about me by Canaris), made the request for me. I myself did not apply, but others applied for me, for reasons which only later became clear to me, because they knew my personal attitude, just as my Austrian comrades—they were necessarily few—knew about this and about me. That is how things stood.

THE PRESIDENT: Before the cross-examination I wish to announce that there will be no public session of the Tribunal this afternoon.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): I am counsel for the Defendant Göring, and I would like to address a few questions to the witness.

Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said yesterday that it was Canaris’ personal conviction that his failure to prevent the attack on Poland would mean the end of Germany and a great misfortune for us. A triumph of the system would mean an even greater disaster, and it was the purpose of General Canaris to prevent this. Did I understand you correctly?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, except for one point: Not that he had not been successful in preventing it, but that it was not possible to prevent it. Canaris had no way of knowing this . . .

DR. STAHMER: Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, in the first years of the war, had very active sabotage organizations behind the enemy front and that he personally worked very hard for these organizations?

LAHOUSEN: Naturally I knew about that, and I have fully informed the American authorities who were interested in this subject.

DR. STAHMER: But how is that possible? This would not be in conformity with his inner political beliefs.

LAHOUSEN: This is explained by the fact that in the circle in which he was active he could never say what he really thought, and thousands of others could not do so either—what I said is a truth without saying. The essential thing is not what he said, or what he had to say in order to follow a purpose; but what he did and how he did it. This I know and others know it, too.

DR. STAHMER: This is not a question of what he said, but of what he actually did. He not only proposed such measures, but also applied himself to their execution—is that true?

LAHOUSEN: Ostensibly he had, of course, to remain within the limits of his office, in order to keep his position. That was the important thing, that he should remain in this position, to prevent in 1939 the thing that actually happened in 1944: that Himmler should take things in hand. I place before you these two men, one against the other: Canaris and Himmler—and I think I need hardly tell you what Canaris was striving for when he (Canaris) took part—ostensibly took part in these activities.

DR. STAHMER: You mentioned the name of Himmler, in this connection, I would like to ask the following question:

Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the war, laid great stress on his good relations with the SS and the necessity for close co-operation with the SS, so much so, that the Defendant Göring had to advise him to be more independent of the SS in his military functions?

THE PRESIDENT: You are going too quickly and I do not think you are observing what I said just now, that it will help the Tribunal if you will ask one question at a time.

DR. STAHMER: I will put my question briefly; did the witness know that Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the war, had good connections with the SS and recognized the necessity for close co-operation with the formation, and never failed to stress this?

LAHOUSEN: So that he might be in a position to see and to know and keep himself informed of everything these people were doing, and be able to intervene wherever and whenever possible.

DR. STAHMER: Was it the duty of your organization, or the duty of Canaris’ department to pass on important enemy intelligence to the military leadership in good time?

DR. STAHMER: Now, according to my information, your office did not pass on to the military departments concerned information of the Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Is that true?

LAHOUSEN: I do not know. Please do not make me responsible for the department. This is a question which could easily be answered by Colonel Pieckenbrock, but not by me.

DR. STAHMER: Regarding the Case “Rowehl,” you said yesterday that a colonel of the Air Force, Rowehl, had formed a special squadron, which had the tasks of making reconnaissance flights over Poland, England, and the southeast sector prior to the Polish campaign. Is that true?

DR. STAHMER: You also said that Colonel Rowehl went to see Admiral Canaris to report on the results of these flights and to submit photographs. Is that true?

DR. STAHMER: I did not say that. How did Colonel Rowehl come to report to Admiral Canaris about this?

LAHOUSEN: I believe I mentioned yesterday, that this was a function of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, Abteilung I.

DR. STAHMER: Have you yourself seen the photographs that were taken over England?

LAHOUSEN: In the office of Canaris they were shown to me. I had nothing to do with them in an official way. I happened to be present at the time. I was interested in seeing what was going on.

LAHOUSEN: I have forgotten the details. They were photographs taken from airplanes.

LAHOUSEN: No, the photographs were not shown to me officially, I was merely an interested spectator on this occasion, as I have just told you.

DR. STAHMER: Did Rowehl give any written reports about these flights to the Amt?

DR. STAHMER: You do not know? You also said that Rowehl’s squadron made flights from Budapest?

DR. STAHMER: Do you know that from your own experience or from some other information?

LAHOUSEN: I know it through personal investigation. The date is entered in the War Diary kept by the section. At that time I was in Budapest, and I was asked to attend the conferring of a citation in Budapest.

LAHOUSEN: I do not know. I said that yesterday. A gentleman of the Air Force would have to answer that.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness, do you know Captain Strünck from the Abwehr?

LAHOUSEN: I would like you to tell me something more than the name. The name alone does not mean anything to me. Give me a few points that will refresh my memory.

DR. DIX: He is a lawyer who was a reserve officer with the Abwehr. I do not know in which department, but I would say it was in the department of Pieckenbrock. However, if you do not know him I will not question you any further.

LAHOUSEN: If he was with Pieckenbrock I do not know him. I knew a few. Is Strünck still alive?

DR. DIX: He suffered the same death as Canaris and Oster. For the information of the Court, I should like to add that I asked this question because I named Strünck as a witness and the Court has admitted him as such. I wish to take this opportunity—but if you do not know him I will not continue questioning you.

LAHOUSEN: When I asked whether he is still alive, I seemed to recall that this man, together with others whom I knew very well, might have been killed, but I cannot be more definite on this point.

DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): I would like to ask the witness a few questions.

Witness, do you know that the Defendant Fritzsche, when in May 1942 he was transferred to the 6th Army as a soldier and there heard for the first time of the existence of an order for executions, recommended to the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Paulus, that he should have this order suspended within the jurisdiction of his army and have this decision made known by leaflets to be dropped over the Russian front?

THE PRESIDENT: Be careful only to ask one question at a time. You have just asked three or four questions at once.

DR. FRITZ: Yes, Sir. Is it known to you that Fritzsche gave Paulus the advice to rescind the order for his army sector?

LAHOUSEN: That order had already been given to his army. Will you kindly give me the approximate date?

DR. FRITZ: That was during the Russian campaign, as I mentioned yesterday. Most of these things occurred in May 1942.

LAHOUSEN: No. I do not know anything about this in connection with Fritzsche. In connection with the name Reichenau, which was mentioned before, I do remember a conversation between Reichenau and Canaris at which I was present. It made a great impression on me. During this conversation, and in this circle, where there were several other gentlemen present, Reichenau held quite different ideas and judged things quite differently from what I had expected of him. Apart from that, I do not know anything about this particular question.

DR. FRITZ: Also nothing concerning the fact that Paulus had rescinded the order within the sector of his army?

LAHOUSEN: No, not in connection with the name Paulus, but in general I believe, as I also stated yesterday, that several army commanders, whose names are no longer in my memory today, or whose names have been recorded, were mentioned by me.

DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?

LAHOUSEN: Kaltenbrunner? I met Kaltenbrunner only once in my life, and that was on a day that will always remain in my memory. It was also the first meeting between Canaris and Kaltenbrunner. It took place in Munich in the Regina Hotel, and it was on the day when two young people, a student and his sister, were arrested and executed. They had distributed leaflets in the auditorium of the University of Munich. I read the contents of the leaflets, and I remember, among other things, that they contained an appeal to the Wehrmacht.

I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar. Of course, Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who was completely shattered because of what had happened that day and was still under the painful impression—and thank God there are still witnesses available who can testify to this. When discussing the matter Kaltenbrunner was very much to the point, but at the same time he was quite cynical about it. That is the only thing I can tell you about this matter.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner claims that Himmler retained full executive powers for himself, while he was only in charge of the intelligence service. Is this borne out by the conversation that you just mentioned?

LAHOUSEN: I would like you to know what bearing that has on the Kaltenbrunner-Himmler matter—the struggle for power which was taking place in the SS. I have merely described this event. I can give you the names of the people present, who like myself were very much impressed for the reasons which I have mentioned.

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): You were asked yesterday whether the orders regarding the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war were known to the leaders of the SA and other organizations, and your answer was that these orders must have been known to them. I would now like to ask you who these leaders were at the time and what were their names?

LAHOUSEN: Who they were and what their names were, I do not know. I also stated explicitly yesterday why I said so. They must have been known to them and to a large circle through the execution of these orders, and, of course, through the return of the wounded. The German people must have learned about them.

HERR BÖHM: In other words, it was only an opinion of yours, but in no way a fact-based on personal observation?

LAHOUSEN: No, it was not. I personally never had anything to do with any SA leader. I never had anything to do with them, and I do not think any one of them knows me well.

HERR BÖHM: Could you make a statement on this, that is, whether the orders which were mentioned yesterday were given to the formations of the SA?

HERR BÖHM: Could you make another statement as to whether the contents of these orders, which were discussed yesterday, were sent to the formations of the SA through official channels?

LAHOUSEN: No, not through official channels, but in the way I have previously indicated; in other words, members of the SA who were also in the Wehrmacht could see actually what happened out there, and when they came back they spoke about it, the same as anyone else. It was only in this connection . . .

HERR BÖHM: Is it known to you whether members of the SA had anything at all to do with the handling of prisoners of war?

HERR BÖHM: I asked you which leaders of the SA formations knew about them, and you answered that they should have known about them.

LAHOUSEN: I said the leaders of these organizations came to know about them in this way.

HERR BÖHM: And today I ask you whether the individual formations of the SA had received these orders.

LAHOUSEN: I can only repeat what I said yesterday, and I think I was very clear on the subject, in other words, how these orders were issued. I myself did not read these orders, but I know the effects they had.

HERR BÖHM: I can imagine myself how this happened, but I asked you whether you know anything about how these orders reached the SA?

HERR BÖHM: You do not know? Do you know anything from your own personal observations about members of the SA being employed for the supervision of prisoner-of-war camps?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, because from my personal observations, once when I was on my way to the Army Group North, I caught an SA man who was kicking a Russian prisoner of war and I pulled him up about it. I think that is mentioned somewhere in my records, and also an episode about an Arbeitsdienst man.

HERR BÖHM: Did you report any of these incidents through the proper channels? Did you see to it that the leaders of this organization were informed about them?

LAHOUSEN: I reported it to my superior officer, or it was mentioned in my report on my visit either orally or in writing. There were discussions on this and similar incidents.

LAHOUSEN: I am looking it up. This is about the Arbeitsdienst man, this document.

LAHOUSEN: I would have to have an opportunity of going through the whole of the material which is in the hands of the American authorities to find this one.

I would also like to inquire whether you were ever able to observe that members of the SA whom you ascertained were employed on supervisory duties, ever took any measures which were in line with the orders against Soviet soldiers.

DR. STAHMER: I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental ruling on whether the defendant also has the right personally to ask the witness questions. According to the German text of the Charter, Paragraph 16, I believe this is permissible.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you have raised and will let you know later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The United States Prosecution would desire to be heard, I am sure, if there were any probability of that view being taken by the Tribunal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that these provisions are mutually exclusive. Each defendant has the right to conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Certainly this would become a performance rather than a trial if we go into that sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we anticipated the possibility that some of these defendants, being lawyers themselves, might conduct their own defenses. If they do so, of course they have all the privileges of counsel. If they avail themselves of the privileges of counsel, they are not, we submit, entitled to be heard in person.

DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that Paragraph 16 (e), according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for my point of view. It says that the defendant has the right, either personally or through his counsel, to present evidence, and according to the German text it is clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution. According to the German text there reference can be made only to the defendant—with respect to terms as well as to the contents. In my opinion it is made clear that the defendant has the right to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant’s counsel, wish to cross-examine the witness?

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I would only like to point out that in the written forms given to us by the Court, the defendant, as well as his counsel can make a motion. A place is left for two signatures on the questionnaire. I conclude, therefore, that the defendant himself has the right to speak on the floor.

THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other defendant’s counsel wished to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Would you put the earphones on, please, unless you understand English. What is it you want to ask now? You have already cross-examined the witness.

HERR BÖHM: Yes, I have cross-examined him, but he has given me to understand that he made a report about an incident which occurred during one of his visits of inspection, and that he has some written notes. As I am not yet able to release the witness, I should like to move that the Prosecution allow to be placed at the disposal of the witness any available notes or reports on the observations made by him at the time, so that he may find the evidence he wants.

THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you want to make any further application with reference to this witness, that you should make it in writing later.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant’s counsel wishes to cross-examine the witness, the Tribunal will now retire for the purpose of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to whether a defendant has the right to cross-examine as well as his own counsel.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who are represented by counsel have not the right to cross-examine witnesses. They have the right to be called as witnesses themselves and to make a statement at the end of the Trial.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Just one question, your Lordship.

THE MARSHAL: That’s right. He was taken away by some captain who brought him here for the Trial. They have sent after him now.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you wish to ask of sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for this witness or for him to be recalled on Monday?

THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn, and it will be understood that in the future no witness will be removed whilst he is under examination, from the precincts of this Court except on the orders of the Tribunal.

COL. AMEN: I do not know how that happened Your Lordship, I understood he was still here.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur within the next week or two weeks in this Trial.

I shall immediately proceed with the aggressive war case, to present the story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I shall not perhaps be able to conclude that today.

Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, has asked that he be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on Count Two and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that.

Thereafter, the British prosecutor will proceed to present the aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England into the war. Thereupon the British prosecutor will proceed with the expansion of aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and Denmark, against Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions.

That, as I understand it, will complete the British case under Count Two and will probably take the rest of this week.

Then it will be necessary for the American prosecuting staff to come back to Count One to cover certain portions which have not been covered, specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation in occupied territories, the High Command, and other alleged criminal organizations, particularly evidence dealing with individual responsibility of individual defendants.

Roughly, I would anticipate that that would carry through the following week—two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate.

Thereupon, the French chief prosecutor will make his opening statement and will present the evidence as to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes under Counts Three and Four as to Western Occupied countries.

Following that, the Russian chief prosecutor will make his opening statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Eastern countries.

I turn now to the third section in the detailed chronological presentation of the aggressive war case: Aggression against Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text of the Indictment.

(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault both on Austria and Czechoslovakia.

On Thursday, last, I completed the presentation of the documents on the execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered together in a document book which was handed to the Tribunal at the beginning of the Austrian presentation.

The materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia have been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the Tribunal and which is marked “Document Book 0.”

The Tribunal will recall that in the period 1933 to 1936 the defendants had initiated a program of rearmament, designed to give the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked on a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression.

At the moment—in the early spring of 1938—when the Nazi conspirators began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program.

The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reich Chancellery on November 5, 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hossbach minutes, you will recall, are contained in Document 386-PS as United States Exhibit Number 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a week ago today.

“The question for Germany,” the Führer had informed his military commanders at that meeting, “is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at the lowest cost.”

On March 12, 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army, and on the following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a redefinition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State.

Among the selected handful of documents which I read to the Tribunal in my introduction a week ago to establish the corpus of the crime of aggressive war was the account of this meeting on 21 April 1938. This account is Item 2 in our Document Number 388-PS, as United States Exhibit Number 26.

The Tribunal will recall that Hitler and Keitel discussed the pretext which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an excuse for war. In the alternative—and this alternative they found to be preferable—they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an incident of their own creation.

Consideration, as we alleged in the Indictment and as the document proved, was given to the assassination of the German Minister at Prague to create the requisite incident.

The necessity of propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within 4 days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside interventions.

Thus, in mid-April 1938, the designs of the Nazi conspirators to conquer Czechoslovakia had already readied the stage of practical planning.

Now all of that occurred, if the Tribunal please, against a background of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and assurances freely given, to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925—Document TC-14, which will be introduced by the British prosecutor—Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice matters of dispute. I quote, they would so refer:

“All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy.”

“The President of the German Reich and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences, which might arise between the two countries; declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations, is obligatory for international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be modified save with its consent, and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of divisions between states, have decided to embody in a treaty their common intention in this respect.”

Formal and categoric assurances of their good will towards Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On March 11 and 12, 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time the Defendant Göring assured Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Göring accompanied his assurance with the statement, “Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort (I give you my word of honor).”

At the same time, the Defendant Von Neurath, who was handling German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop’s stay in London, assured Masaryk, on behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still considered herself bound by the Arbitration Convention of 1925.

These assurances are contained in Document TC-27, another of the series of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British prosecutor under Count Two of the Indictment.

Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators proceeded with their military and political plans for aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by Fifth Column activities, while the actual military preparations were being developed.

The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938. Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to “Fall Grün” (Case Green), the designation given to the proposed operation against Czechoslovakia.

The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline from as early as June 1937. The OKW top-secret directive for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war—signed by Von Blomberg on June 24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning July 1, 1937,—included, as a probable war-like eventuality for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, “War on two fronts, with the main struggle in the southeast.”

This document—our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69—was introduced in evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg. The original section of this directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakia—it was later revised—opens with this supposition. I read from the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation of this directive, following the heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed “Suppositions”:

“The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand.”

After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such action, the directive continues as follows:

“(2) The task of the German Armed Forces”—and that much is underscored—“is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this attack.

“The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia.”

The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding principles the following statement—and I now read from Page 1 of the English translation, that is, the third paragraph following Figure 1:

“Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:”—and then—“(a) to counterattack at any time; (b) to make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur.”

This directive ordered further work on the plan for “mobilization without public announcement.” I quote:

“. . . in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a sudden war which will take the enemy by surprise, in regard to both strength and time of attack.”

This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.

Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political level, this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5 November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes, to which I have frequently heretofore referred.

In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for General Keitel’s confidential cognizance the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an interchange of views. This is Document 2786-PS, a photostat of the original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:

“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect. With best regards and Heil Hitler.”

At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Document 388-PS, Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time. This meeting was followed, in the late spring and summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green (Fall Grün). Those notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler’s headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the Führer’s military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is preserved intact, bears out Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit Number 26. We affectionately refer to it as “Big Schmundt”—a large file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators’ planning to launch an unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the Tribunal I shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General Jodl’s office of the OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler’s headquarters.

MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn’t intended to read them in full, unless that may be necessary.

MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed, “Short Survey of Armament of the Czech Army,” dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialed “Z” for Zeitzler, and Item 13, “Questions of the Führer,” dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and classified “Most Secret.” I should like to read four of the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on Pages 23, 24, 25, and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS.

Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czech Army. I don’t think it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving information in response to these questions posed by Hitler.

“Question 2: How many battalions, et cetera, are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

“Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

“Question. 4: Frontier protection in the West.”

As I say, those questions were answered in detail by the OKW and initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl’s staff.

As a precaution against French and British action during the attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at Page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file, Page 12 of Document 388-PS: “Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and General Keitel.” And then, skipping a paragraph: “The Führer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the West.”

In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between Hitler and his political and military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to the more important of these conferences and directives.

On 28 May 1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal advisors. At this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his fellow conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This fact Hitler later publicly admitted. I now refer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to Document 2360-PS, a copy of the Völkischer Beobachter of 31 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the preceding day, reported in this newspaper, reading now from Document 2360-PS, Hitler spoke as follows:

“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there, I have determined to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question. On 28 May I ordered first: That preparation should be made for military action against this state by 2 October. I ordered second: The immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West.”

Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued the revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item 11 in the Big Schmundt file, Document 388-PS. It is entitled, “Two-front War, with Main Effort in the Southeast,” and this directive replaced the corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the previous quote, “Directive for Unified Preparation for War,” which had been promulgated by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have already introduced in evidence as our Document C-175, United

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

ELEVENTH DAY Monday, 3 December 1945

Morning Session

ELEVENTH DAY
Monday, 3 December 1945